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Abstract
Biologists and conservation advocates have expressed grave concern over perceived
threats to biological diversity.  “Biodiversity prospecting” -- the search among naturally
occurring organisms for new products of agricultural, industrial, and, particularly,
pharmaceutical value -- has been advanced as both a mechanism and a motive for conserving
biological diversity.  Economists and others have attempted to estimate the value of
biodiversity for use in new pharmaceutical project research.  Most of these existing approaches
are incomplete, however, as they have not considered full social welfare, i.e., both consumer
surplus and profit.  This paper addresses social welfare by calibrating a model of competition
between differentiated products with data from the pharmaceutical industry.  We find that the
magnitude of losses from even catastrophic declines in biodiversity are negligible in
comparison to the value of world production.  While social values of biodiversity prospecting
might motivate habitat conservation in some areas, these values are likely to be small relative
to land value in other uses in even some of the more biologically rich regions of the world.
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INTRODUCTION
A number of biologists believe that human activities are causing species extinctions at
alarming rates.  The only precedents, they claim, are to be found in the mass extinctions
associated with a handful of apocalyptic volcanic eruptions and/or meteorite strikes distributed
over geological time scales (Wilson, 1992).  Slowing the rates of greenhouse gas emissions,
natural habitat destruction, and other factors that are believed to be inducing modern
extinctions could be very expensive, however.  It is natural to ask, then, what is the value of
preserving biodiversity.
One (although admittedly, among many) argument frequently made is that biodiversity is
a source of new industrial, agricultural, and, particularly, pharmaceutical products.  Natural
organisms, it is argued, are great repositories of genetic information.  Wild species, in their
struggle to capture prey, escape predators, resist infection, and enhance reproductive success
have evolved chemical mechanisms more elaborate and inventive than those synthetic chemists
can now create.  If these chemical mechanisms could be adapted and refined for human use, they
could be of great value.  There has, therefore, been considerable interest among natural scientists
and conservation advocates in "biodiversity prospecting" -- the search for new commercial
products among naturally occurring organisms -- as both a mechanism and an argument for
preserving biodiversity (see, e.g., Wilson, 1992; Reid, et al., 1993; Rubin and Fish, 1994).
In recent years economists and others have attempted to estimate the value of
biodiversity for use in new product development (Principe, 1989; Pearce and Puroshothamon,
1992; Aylward, 1993; Artuso, 1994; Mendelsohn and Balick, 1995; Polasky and Solow, 1995;
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Simpson, Sedjo and Reid, 1996).  These studies vary considerably in their data, methods, and
estimates.  With the exception of the Principe (1989) paper,2 however, previous efforts at
valuation have not attempted to derive the social, as opposed to private, values of biodiversity
for new product research.  We turn to that issue in this paper.
This paper also reconciles a difference between the method adopted in Principe (1989),
Pearce and Puroshothamon (1992), Aylward (1993), Artuso (1994), and Mendelsohn and
Balick (1995) on one hand, and that adopted by Polasky and Solow (1995) and Simpson,
Sedjo, and Reid (1996) on the other.3  In the former set of papers the researchers calculate the
value of a species by multiplying the probability with which a species will yield some
commercial product by the average value of a commercial product.  In the latter set of papers,
the researchers calculate the value of a species by deriving its incremental contribution to the
probability that a particular product of commercial value will be discovered.4  The former
method is unsatisfactory, as it fails to allow for potential competition between different
products derived from different sources.  The latter method is also unsatisfactory, however, in
that it supposes that different products derived from different species must either be perfect
substitutes or wholly unrelated.
In this paper we suppose that different products derived from different species can be
imperfect substitutes for each other.  We begin with a variant of Salop's (1979) model of
differentiated products, in which different products are located at different places around a
                                               
2 Principe's treatment is problematic for several reasons.  First, he measures social welfare from the value of a
statistical life saved.  It is difficult to ascribe lives saved to particular therapies.  Second, he does not consider
substitution or marginal valuation, but rather total and average values.  Finally, proxies for consumer surplus
by pharmaceutical costs, on the basis of an apparently ad hoc assumption that they are of comparable
magnitudes.
3 See also Brown and Goldstein (1984) for another paper in which valuation, in this case of agricultural
improvement leads, is conducted on the margin.  Also, work on the definition of meaningful measures of
diversity (see:  Weitzman, 1992; 1993; Polasky, Solow, and Broadus, 1993; and Solow and Polasky, 1994) is
related, as incremental diversity only increases the measure of a set to the extent that it does not duplicate
existing elements.
4 Multiple discoveries are possible in the Simpson, Sedjo, and Reid paper, however, as each species may be
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circle representing the space of all consumers' preferences.  In contrast to Salop's approach, we
do not assume that products are symmetrically distributed around the circle.  Rather, we
suppose that each species represents a different research opportunity, and that each is equally
likely to yield some commercial product which will be randomly located on the circle.
Deriving analytical expressions for expected profits and welfare is difficult in this model, and
equilibrium behavior is problematic under some configurations of products.  Using numerical
calculations and under what we will argue are reasonable assumptions, however, we are able to
come to policy relevant conclusions.
Our general finding is that incremental losses of biological diversity will not cause great
social losses with respect to the needs of new pharmaceutical product development.  There are
a number of considerations that motivate this conclusion, but they can all be summed up in the
statement that there is a sort of diamonds-and-water paradox at work.  Biological diversity is
sufficiently abundant that incremental losses are unlikely to have much effect on social welfare.
Our results are relevant to two policy issues.  The first concerns the overall
consequences of biodiversity loss.  Even if substantial biodiversity loss may occur as a result of
global changes in climate, our results suggest that the lost value of biodiversity for use in new
pharmaceutical research is negligible compared to measures of world product.  Thus climate
and atmospheric stabilization measures that would demand substantial sacrifices in world
product cannot be justified by this consideration alone.  We hasten to point out, however, that
there are any number of other esthetic, ethical, ecological, and even spiritual reasons for which
biodiversity may be important, and all should be investigated before final conclusions
concerning the wisdom of climate and atmospheric stabilization policies is judged.
The second policy issue to which our analysis might be addressed concerns land use.
Biodiversity is also, and arguably is most, threatened by the clearing of natural habitat for
agriculture and other uses.  Our results are more ambiguous here.  On one hand, the incentives
to maintain land in natural habitat are not large, and we can argue that we have been generous
in our assumptions.  On the other hand, however, since the values generated by convertingThe Social Value of Using Biodiversity in New Pharmaceutical Product Research -5-
Figure 1 is available from the authors at
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were undertaken simultaneously among all species for products of commercial value.  We will
calibrate the private and social values that might be expected to be generated as a result of such a
search by looking at existing industry statistics.
From (12), social surplus would be no greater than 5/12n times expected industry
profits.  Let us sketch out a rough estimate of industry profits.  Annual expenditures on
pharmaceutical products in the 23 OECD countries excluding Japan is approximately $175
billion; see Table 110 (PRMA, 1996; data for Japan were not listed).  These countries account
for about three-fifths of world product (World Bank, 1995).  Thus, if we assume that
expenditures on pharmaceutical products are in the same proportion to income in the rest of
the world as they are in the OECD countries -- an assumption we think is generous -- we
would arrive at a world-wide figure of some $300 billion per year in pharmaceutical product
sales.  Discounted at about three percent per year, we might suppose that a figure on the order
of ten trillion dollars might be a reasonable estimate of the expected present value of all future
pharmaceutical product sales.
Using data from pharmaceutical companies on which publicly filed financial information is
available, we find that production costs vary between roughly one quarter and four tenths of firm
sales (see Table 2).  We might also regard at least some portion of marketing and administration
expenses as variable costs, both because sales might be expected to be proportional to product
advertising and promotion, and because we have streamlined our theoretical model by not
including as a component of social cost the set-up costs of new products.11  Thus we might
                                               
10 In nine of the twenty-three countries data on expenditures on pharmaceutical products were not given
separately from expenditures on health care.  In these cases, we have extrapolated by supposing that
expenditures on pharmaceutical products are in the same proportion to total health care expenditures as the
average of the ratios for countries for which data is available in both categories.
11 Arguably, these costs should have been included in our model, but we feel that they would have complicated the
exposition without adding much insight.  We might also note in passing, comparing the figures for the different
companies listed in Table 2, that it seems likely that different companies have different definitions of production
costs and sales and administrative expenses.  Those reporting higher values for the former report lower values for
the latter.  This suggests to us that there may not always be a sharp distinction between the two.-14- Simpson and Craft
Table 1:
Health and pharmaceutical expenditure data for OECD countries










Australia* $310,184 $26,366 $3,714
Austria 152,671 14,198 1,525
Belgium 194,498 16,143 2,689
Canada 555,494 56,660 8,578
Denmark 100,351 6,724 760
Finland* 78,448 6,903 972
France 1,076,457 105,493 17,750
Germany 1,353,638 116,413 21,503
Greece* 90,925 5,183 730
Iceland 4,976 413 54
Ireland 48,991 3,282 458
Italy 1,020,292 86,725 15,649
Luxembourg* 10,977 757 107
Netherlands 269,134 23,415 2,564
Norway* 83,720 6,865 967
New Zealand 53,291 4,103 659
Portugal* 118,490 8,650 1,218
Spain* 520,273 37,980 5,350
Sweden 147,184 11,039 1,406
Switzerland* 161,152 15,954 2,247
Turkey* 324,011 8,748 1,232
United Kingdom 981,892 69,714 10,389
United States 6,270,957 884,205 74,956
* Data on pharmaceutical product expenditures was unavailable for these countries.  It has been imputed assuming that
the ratio pharmaceutical product expenditure to total health care expenditure is the average of that for the countries for
which full data was available.
Source: 1993 figures for Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development member nations (excluding Japan),
electronically retrieved from PRMA (1996).The Social Value of Using Biodiversity in New Pharmaceutical Product Research -15-
Table 2:












       Net sales 6,704 8,281 14,970 4,175 34,130
       Production costs 1,822 1,919 5,962 1,371 11,074
       Marketing and
       administrative costs
2,617 3,251 3,178 1,512 10,558
       Research and
       development costs
1,254 1,139 1,231 600 4,224
Source:  1994 Annual Reports electronically retrieved from SEC (1996).
suppose that industry profits gross of R&D would run to some forty percent of total sales,
leaving us with a figure of about four trillion dollars.  If we take ten millions species as a lower
bound estimate of the total number of species on which pharmaceutical research can be
performed (Wilson, 1992; p. 134), expression (12) implies a maximum social value of the
marginal species of about $170,000.
We emphasize that this is an upper bound on the maximum social value, as we have as
yet included no estimate of the costs of R&D.  Here we have a still more difficult time relating
our model to the real data, as the observed patterns of R&D spending are at odds with our
depiction of R&D as an expense incurred only once, before any products are marketed.
Let us suspend credulity a little longer, however.  Note first that our model requires
that costs of R&D be less than five-twelfths of the expected payoff in order for the marginal
species to be of positive social value at all.  It seems entirely possible that the value of the
marginal species would be negative, given a suboptimal market structure vis-à-vis the
allocation of research and development effort and expenditure.  To generate an estimate,
however, let us make another heroic assumption.  Suppose that current R&D expenditures canThe Social Value of Using Biodiversity in New Pharmaceutical Product Research -19-
for rough estimates.  These estimates are reported in Table 3.  The social values for habitat
preservation among these biodiversity "hotspots" range from a little less than thirty to a little
less than 3000 dollars per hectare.
We have, arguably, now reached the point where the imprecisions in our work render us
unable to make any policy-relevant pronouncements, but let us venture a couple nonetheless.
First, there are reasons to suppose (see the following section) that we have been generous in
constructing our estimates.  Thus, the simple fact that we do not get astronomical figures for any
area, and modest figures for the "cooler" of even these "hot spots" suggests that a broad
international policy of subsidizing habitat preservation could not be justified solely on this basis.
Our second observation is that there may well be some areas in which such subsidization could be
appropriate.  This is, in fact, almost tautological in some instances.  Some areas continue to
support high biodiversity precisely because they are so remote, unpopulated, and generally
inhospitable to human occupation as to be valueless for other uses.  Thus, to the extent that there
is some value to be realized by leaving such lands as repositories of biodiversity, the needs of new
product research constitute an argument for their preservation.  Again, however, it seems
doubtful that this argument will be compelling when property values in alternative uses are high.13
                                               
13 Let us offer two additional observations.  The first concerns property values.  As we noted in the text,
property values probably are negligible in some biodiverse areas.  On the other hand, however, some threatened
biota are located in areas of high population density, great pressure, for alternative uses, and consequently, high
property values.  Atlantic coast Brazil (the seventh "hot spot" in Table 3)and Central Chile (the seventeenth
"hot spot") include the largest cities of those countries.  The California floristic province, (the eighteenth "hot
spot") includes major metropolitan areas of California and northern Mexico (Wilson, 1992; pp. 260-269).
While one does not want to generalize from admittedly casual empiricism, one of the authors was surprised to
discover on a recent research mission that land in Southwestern Sri Lanka could sell for tens of thousands of
dollars per hectare (admittedly, however, this may be due in large part to restrictions on the sale and use of
other plots of land in the area).
Our second observation is that land values may be highest in those biodiverse areas that also boast
sufficient physical and intellectual infrastructure to attract pharmaceutical researchers.  Thus, while very
backward areas may not face great pressures for conversion, they also may not be attractive locations for
biodiversity prospecting.  Perhaps, then, biodiversity prospecting will be a more financially attractive use of
land in the more developed of the biodiversity-rich areas.  (We are grateful to Anthony Artuso for stimulating
conversations on this issue.)-20-
Table 3:
Social value of the marginal hectare of land for use in biodiversity prospecting
Present Implied
forest area Number total Density of Value of the
(1000s of of plant  number Proportion endemics  marginal
"Hot spot" hectares) species of species of endemics per hectare hectare
Western Ecuador 250 8,750 350,000 0.25 0.35000 $2,888
Southwestern Sri Lanka 70 1,000 40,000 0.50 0.28571 2,357
New Caledonia 150 888 35,520 0.89 0.21075 1,739
Madagascar 1,000 3,550 142,000 0.82 0.11644 961
Western Ghats of India 800 4,050 162,000 0.40 0.08100 668
Philippines 800 3,595 143,800 0.44 0.07909 652
Atlantic Coast Brazil 2,000 7,500 300,000 0.50 0.07500 619
Uplands of western Amazonia 3,500 15,383 615,320 0.25 0.04395 363
Tanzania 600 1,600 64,000 0.33 0.03520 290
Cape Floristic Province of South Africa 8,900 8,600 344,000 0.73 0.02822 233
Peninsular Malaysia 2,600 5,799 231,960 0.28 0.02498 206
Southwestern Australia 5,470 3,630 145,200 0.78 0.02070 171
Ivory Coast 400 2,770 110,800 0.07 0.01939 160
Northern Borneo 6,400 6,856 274,240 0.39 0.01671 138
Eastern Himalayas 5,300 5,655 226,200 0.39 0.01664 137
Colombian Choco 7,200 9,212 368,480 0.25 0.01279 106
Central Chile 4,600 2,900 116,000 0.50 0.01261 104
California Floristic Province 24,600 4,450 178,000 0.48 0.00347 29
Sources: Myers (1988, 1990); Simpson, Sedjo, and Reid (1996), and authors' calculations.The Social Value of Using Biodiversity in New Pharmaceutical Product Research -21-
V. HOW  UNREALISTIC  IS  THE  MODEL?
As we have emphasized above, we have chosen to work with a model that is much
more tractable than it is realistic.  Since we are suggesting a strong conclusion-that biological
diversity is not of great social value as a source of new pharmaceutical products-we are
obliged to justify our conclusion by anticipating a number of objections.  As we have noted
above, there are also some technical details and assumptions which we have relegated to an
appendix.  In this section, we will deal with some more general issues.
We might say that the value of the marginal species depends on two things.  First, by
how much does the existence of an additional species increase the probability with which a
useful product is found?  Second, when a new product is found, by how much is social welfare
increased as a result of its introduction?  Our conclusion that the social value of the marginal
species is small is based on the argument that the marginal species adds little probability to the
event that an additional product is found in those states of the world in which useful products
are rare.  Let us now ask to what extent the generation of this conclusion in our model is an
artifact of the assumptions we have made.  We can think of generalizations along two lines, the
first being the forms of the social welfare and probability density functions, and the second
being the timing of product demands and discovery.
Generalizing  the  Functional  Forms
We have chosen our generalization of the Salop model because it is (numerically, if not
necessarily analytically) tractable.  There were, of course, other alternatives.  Examples include
Perloff and Salop's (1985) random-utility specification and Dixit and Stiglitz's (1977) model, in
which each consumer purchases some of each available product. The relative advantage of the
circular-product-space specification we have adopted is that it affords a straightforward way of
describing a market with differentiated products in which consumers choose among products
based on their relative efficacy for their needs.  This seems a not unreasonable general
description of the pharmaceutical market:  customers generally choose (or are prescribed) that
drug that best treats their condition, and the degree to which the prices of other products affect-22- Simpson and Craft
willingness to pay for the particular product chosen depends on substitutability between
products.  The Salop model also facilitates calibration with available aggregate data.
Having said this, though, there is no particular reason to suppose that competition
takes place along only one dimension, or that disutility is linear in some measure of distance.
Salop developed his original model to illustrate a point:  that there may be excessive entry in a
monopolistically competitive equilibrium.  That we find that there may be excessive research
under uncertainty is an artifact of the specification, and there is no reason to suppose that it
necessarily generalizes.
What does seem obvious, however, is that any model in which uncertain R&D is likely
to lead to a relatively large number of products will describe a situation in which there is
competition between products.  This implies two things.  First, the introduction of an
additional product will result in a transfer of benefits from the producers of existing products
to consumers and the producer of the new product.  The second implication of the expected
number of products to be developed being relatively large is that it is unlikely that any one
product will command a local monopoly, or, equivalently, that there is any large segment of
consumers who are unserved-however inadequately-by at least some existing product.  If the
most substantial social benefits of new product creation arise from the advent of products to
meet previously unmet demands, not the reshuffling of consumers between products that are
more or less effective for their particular needs, a model that presumes that all consumers are
served will not assign high values to additional products.
On this point there is some merit to the objection that we have essentially assumed our
conclusion.  By supposing that expression (3) is valid-that each product is in price competition
with its two closest neighbors, in contrast to alternative market structures characterized by
local monopolies or duopolies-we are assuming that new products attract customers from
existing products, rather than meeting previously unmet demands.  Our defense to this
objection is empirical.  Even if a new drug proves to be vastly superior to existing treatments,
it is generally the case that the new drug displaces some existing product. Aspirin does not
cure AIDS, but it is helpful for at least some of the symptoms.The Social Value of Using Biodiversity in New Pharmaceutical Product Research -23-
It might also be objected that the assumption of a uniform distribution of product
locations around the circle is unrealistic.  This does not, however, seem an unreasonable
assumption ex ante.  Researchers do not necessarily put their effort into those projects in
which they believe their chances of success to be greatest, but rather, into those in which they
think it most probable that they will be successful and their rivals will not (see, e.g., Dasgupta
and Maskin 1987).  We have abstracted from a great deal of real-world detail, but this is one
instance in which we might expect a consideration we have not modeled-the choice of area in
which to do research-to support our choice to model a uniform distribution of products
around the circle.  Related to this issue is our assumption that each species is implicitly
assigned to an independent firm.  In the real world, of course, pharmaceutical research
organizations are often relatively large, and one company may sell dozens of products.  It does
not seem unreasonable, however, to assume that the different products of a single firm are
either so close together as to treat as the same product, or sufficiently far apart as to have little
influence on joint pricing decisions.
The final consideration in the form of the welfare objective concerns the use of the
consumer-surplus-plus-profit concept.  We might well expect income effects to be important in
this context-a very ill person might be willing to part with virtually all his wealth to obtain a
cure.  At the level of generality at which we are working, however, we doubt that this
oversight greatly biases our results.  Another consideration is the distribution of income.
Society might assign a greater value to provision of medicines to the world's poor than is
indicated by their ability to pay for such drugs.  This observation begs the usual question as to
why, if we feel this way, we do not act in accordance with our sentiments and give the poor
enough wealth to afford the medicines or other necessities they require.  It also might be noted
that the nutritional and health problems of developing countries can, by and large, be treated
with products that are relatively common and cheap.  Discovering new products is unlikely to
help when the real problem involves distributing existing ones.-24- Simpson and Craft
Timing
We have made restrictively specific assumptions about the welfare function and the
probability distribution, but we have ignored the matter of timing altogether.  Implicitly, we
have assumed that all species are tested in a single period.  In the real world, of course, the
testing of natural products for their pharmaceutical potential is an ongoing process.  Different
species are tested at different times for the same purpose, and the same species is tested at
different times for different purposes.  The set of conditions for which treatments are sought
changes over time as new diseases are identified, population and wealth increase, and
demographic characteristics change.
We could make some concession to dynamics by supposing that all products have an
equal, finite, useful life.  This might be the situation if, for example, disease organisms develop
resistance to drugs over time.  Then we could consider a process under which researchers test
all n species at time zero and identify and market m0 products.  These products "expire" at time
1, at which time the n species are again tested, and m1 products are identified.  These products
"expire" at time 2, m2 products are identified, and so forth ad infinitum.  This process is also
not particularly realistic, but it suggests that a somewhat more realistic process, while being
more difficult to model, would not give qualitatively different results.
Potentially more problematic is the fact that the size of the circle, as we have
represented the extent of the market in our model, does not stay constant over time.  It may
well grow with wealth and demographic changes.  Again, however, it would seem that we
might capture these differences by adjusting the discount rate to reflect an increase in expected
sales over time.  It seems unlikely either that indefinite rapid growth in demand for
pharmaceutical products is possible or that such a growth-adjusted long-term discount rate
could be small enough to produce a dramatic inflation in our estimate of the social value of the
marginal species.
We also have not modeled uncertainty in the appearance or intensity of new product
demands.  Such uncertainty introduces considerations of option pricing:  biodiversity is an
asset whose value fluctuates stochastically and whose extinction is irreversible.  It is wellThe Social Value of Using Biodiversity in New Pharmaceutical Product Research -25-
known that the properly calculated price of such an asset exceeds the expected value of the
returns to which it gives rise (see, e.g., Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).  Again, however, we must
ask whether this fact really makes much difference.  While there is certainly temporal variation
in the demand for new products, aggregate variation is not unbounded.  It seems highly
unlikely that the option premium would be large enough to change our results drastically.
Three other dynamic considerations lead us to believe that the very rough estimates we
have ventured above greatly overestimate the social value of the marginal species.  The first of
these considerations can be appreciated by returning to the issue of why our description of the
research process is so unrealistic.  In the real world, pharmaceutical researchers do not test all
species simultaneously.  Rather, they choose some to test initially, proceed to further testing
with those among the first batch tested that appear most promising, and select another group
for initial testing.  It is estimated that less than one percent of all plant species have been tested
for their medicinal properties (Bankson, 1996).  In a world in which testing is proceeding at so
slow a rate, it can reasonably be argued that the marginal species would not even come into a
laboratory for several generations14 -and hence, that its discounted present value would be
correspondingly lower.15  In a recent paper in which it is easier to model a dynamic sampling
strategy than it is in this case, in which product differentiation matters, Simpson and Sedjo
(1996a) argue that the marginal species is of little private value; if it were, researchers would
make greater haste to test it.  Unless it could be argued that extensive public investment should
                                               
14 One can, of course, argue that researchers test the most promising species first, and hence that the value of
the marginal promising species is substantially greater than we have suggested.  If we are considering
arguments for conserving biological diversity more generally, however, we should not distinguish between
species that are promising or unpromising with respect to their pharmaceutical research potential.  Moreover, it
is not always clear that researchers test the most promising or the most easily available natural products.
Sample collection in the relatively stable nation of Costa Rica is certainly a more attractive proposition than
would be, for example, collection amid the civil strife in Burundi.
15 This observation begs the questions of whether the rate at which testing takes place is socially optimally vis-
à-vis the social benefits arising from the provision of new products.  While the literature on innovation in
patent races is mixed, there appears to be no reason to suppose that innovative effort is too slow in general (see
Reinganum, 198, and the literature cited there).-26- Simpson and Craft
be undertaken to increase the pace of pharmaceutical research, we believe that this argument is
also compelling in considering social values.16
The second dynamic consideration that may argue that our figures are overestimates is
that, over time, the range of substitutable research opportunities grows.  The n species in the
denominator of expression (12) may be augmented by technological progress.  Advances in
synthetic chemistry provide substitutes for natural product leads.  Moreover, synthetic
chemistry supplements natural product leads.  Naturally occurring molecules can be used as
blueprints for the creation of less toxic, more effective related compounds.  Rather than having
to find an organic source that meets their needs exactly, pharmaceutical researchers can,
increasingly, modify naturally occurring substances into novel forms.
The final reason for which our procedure likely produces an overestimate of the value
of biodiversity in new pharmaceutical product research is simply that we do not take into
account the fact that many products have already been discovered.  While it is true, as we
noted above, that the need for new products is always expanding as drug-resistant
microorganisms evolve and demographic conditions change, much of the existing stock of
natural-product-based medicines remains effective, and provides starting points for the
synthesis of other compounds.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have considered the social incentives for the conservation of biodiversity for use in
new pharmaceutical product research.  While it is extremely difficult to generate accurate
estimates of such values, and we are reluctant to defend the figures we report as more than
order-of-magnitude estimates, we believe that these results have some important policy
implications.  The first is that one cannot defend expensive policies for biodiversity
                                               
16 This begs the question as to whether such publicly financed investments ought be made.  While arguments
have been made along these lines (see Mendelsohn and Balick, 1995; Artuso, 1996), this strikes us as a "small
tail wagging a big dog."  Simpson and Sedjo (1996b) have argued that such efforts are unlikely to be cost-
effective.The Social Value of Using Biodiversity in New Pharmaceutical Product Research -27-
preservation-preventing climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions, for example-by
appeal to the value of biodiversity for use in new pharmaceutical product research.  The
second implication is that, while biodiversity prospecting might motivate conserving some
threatened biota, the incentives are not great enough to motivate the preservation of all such
endangered habitats.
Let us conclude with two final thoughts.  The first concerns the uses and limits of
economic research.  It is often, and rightly, pointed out that the preservation of biodiversity is
an exceedingly complex issue, fraught with uncertainties.  Biologists have difficulty estimating
even the number of living species to within an order of magnitude,17 and the relationships
between biodiversity, climate change, and habitat destruction are very poorly understood.
Regrettably, the response to this uncertainty is all too often a throwing up of hands, and
unwillingness to attempt any analysis whatsoever of the values involved.  While we do not
pretend to any great accuracy, the analysis we have done suggests that at least one set of
arguments is not compelling as a motivation for expensive biodiversity conservation efforts.
Some economists do not find this result surprising; as we said in the introduction, it is an
instance of the diamonds and water paradox.  We believe that it is useful to conduct this sort of
formal analysis as best we can, however.  It is at least helps to focus the debate on the more
relevant questions.
This leads us to our second thought.  The bottom line of our research is not that
biodiversity is not valuable.  There are many other commercial, ecological, esthetic, and even
spiritual reasons for which it may be.  We do not claim to have considered any of these beyond
the narrow focus of new product values.  We also believe, however, that the costs of
maintaining biodiversity at the levels some advocates suggest also raise profound questions.
The answers to these questions may be found, at least in part, by applying the tools of
                                               
17 This imprecision has implications for the reliability of our estimates of the value of the marginal species.
We would argue, however, first that we have been conservative in the estimate we have used for the number of
species, and second that the number of species cancels in our calculation of value of the marginal hectare of
habitat.-28- Simpson and Craft
economics analysis to the other values of biodiversity in a fashion analogous to what we have
done here.The Social Value of Using Biodiversity in New Pharmaceutical Product Research -29-
Figure 3 is available from the authors at
Resources for the Future-30- Simpson and Craft
Figure 4 is available from the authors at
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Figure 5 is available from the authors at
Resources for the Future-32- Simpson and Craft-36- Simpson and Craft
They do, however, occur, so we ought to explain why we continue to use the model.
First, such exceptions to the application of (3) as we observe tend to affect only a small region
of the circle,19 at least when there are many products.  Whatever the pricing rules followed for
regions in which the application of (3) is invalid, pricing elsewhere will be little different.
Second, we might suppose that sellers have some influence on the perceived differentiation of
their products.  It might not be unreasonable to suppose that sellers would choose to invest
enough in differentiating advertising, marketing, etc., as to restore some well-ordered
equilibrium.  Third, we might suppose, especially in the industry that we are investigating, that
legal (e. g., patent) or other barriers exist to prevent the simultaneous sale of extremely similar
products.  If this were the case, using our model would overstate the value of the marginal
species, which seems the appropriate bias to accept, given our general conclusions.  Finally,
such a simple and stylized model should not be taken too seriously.  It suffices for our purpose
that we generate generally plausible forms for demands, profits, and welfare.  We certainly do
not claim that our model is literally true, only that it provides a useful way of approaching our
problem.  While it may be inconsistent in minor specifics, it does not seem unreasonable as a
stylized description of how products compete, how numbers matter, and how uncertainty enters.
MONOPOLY  AND  DUOPOLY  OUTCOMES
We have just seen that the equilibrium solution embodied in (3) may not be valid when
products are clustered too tightly together.  It may also not hold when there are too few
products around the circle, and/or products are too far apart.  Of course, if only one
commercial product were developed, the firm providing that product would be a monopolist,
and if only two products were developed, the firms providing them would be duopolists.  We
                                          
determined by ( ).  By lowering price sufficiently, the firm can induce a discontinuous increase in demand (see
the discussion of "supercompetitive" regions in Salop, 1979, for tha analog in the symmetric case).  In
extensive numerical exercises, we have not found this to be a concern.
19   It can be demonstrated analytically that the effects of proximity among products, and hence, prices, in one
region of the circle tends to drop off rapidly as we move around the circle.The Social Value of Using Biodiversity in New Pharmaceutical Product Research -39-
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